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Abstract
We propose an adaptive 1-to-many negotiation strategy for multiagent coalition formation in complex environments that are dynamic, uncertain, and real-time. Our strategy deals with how to assign multiple issues to a set
of concurrent negotiations based on an initiating agent’s confidence in its profiling of its peer agents. When an
agent is confident, it uses a packaged approach—conducting multiple multi-issue negotiations—with its peers.
Otherwise, it uses a pipelined approach—conducting multiple single-issue negotiations—with its peers. The initiating agent is also capable of using both approaches in a hybrid, dealing with a mixed group of responding
peers. An agent’s confidence in its profile or view of another agent is crucial, and that depends on the environment in which the agents operate. To evaluate the proposed strategy, we use a coalition formation framework
in a complex environment. Results show that the proposed strategy outperforms the purely pipelined strategy
and the purely packaged strategy in both efficiency and effectiveness.
Keywords: strategic negotiations, adaptive, confidence, negotiation management

tics guided by long-term strategies to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides. This need is particularly
prominent in resource-constrained, complex environments: any misuse of negotiation resources for solving a present task could potentially prevent the agent
from handling subsequent tasks. Conducting effective
and efficient negotiations in complex environments is
difficult. Complex environments that we consider in
this paper are dynamic, uncertain, and real-time. The
initial states that trigger the agents’ negotiation process in the first place may dynamically change while
the negotiation process is still on-going. The negotiation outcome is uncertain such that a negotiation carried out in the same manner does not always yield the
same results at different times. Also, each negotiation
is time-constrained such that an agreement reached past
a deadline specified for a task is not acceptable. If an
agent simply reacts when it negotiates in such an environment, it will not be able to plan to conserve its

1. Introduction
Negotiation is a form of interaction among autonomous agents in which a group of agents with a desire
to cooperate but with potentially conflicting interests
seek to reach an agreement on a set of issues [5,12,20].
A negotiation issue can be any good, service, scarce resource, or unique capability that one agent can provide
to another agent for a reward. A negotiation may address multiple issues or only one issue at a time. In this
paper we focus on multi-issue negotiations on task and
resource allocation in cooperative problem solving.
An agent that encounters a problem may initiate
1-to-many negotiations and concurrently negotiate
with multiple agents over resources or services (capabilities). During negotiations, both the agent that initiates negotiations (i.e., the initiating agent) and each
peer agent that responds to a negotiation request (i.e.,
the responding agent) may need to use short-term tac313
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resources for later tasks. If an agent only looks at the
big picture, it might not be able to meet the individual needs and behaviors of the different agents encountered during negotiations. The problem is compounded when there are multiple issues at hand and
an initiating agent needs to conduct multiple, concurrent negotiations with more than one responding
agent. Should the initiating agent negotiate with as
many responding agents as possible as long as it has
the resources to do so, thus possibly starving itself of
those resources if a new task appears? Should the initiating agent identifies the best responding agent and
tries to persuade that agent to take care of all issues,
with the risk that if the negotiation falls through, the
initiating agent would have to start the process with
another responding agent, thus losing valuable time?
What should the strategy be?
We propose an adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy, first described in [17]. Briefly, after identifying a set of capable peers for a particular task at
hand, the initiating agent then decides how to conduct
its multiple, concurrent negotiations. If the initiating
agent is confident in a peer’s consistency, then it uses a
packaged approach; otherwise, a pipelined approach.
In a pipelined approach, the two negotiating agents negotiate on one issue at a time. In a packaged approach,
the two agents negotiate on multiple issues during one
negotiation. Using the pipelined approach, the initiating agent can switch remaining, yet-to-be-negotiated
issues to other peers that have completed their negotiations with the initiating agent. This allows the initiating agent to be more efficient and effective. With
the packaged approach, the initiating agent has the advantage of likely reaching agreements sooner on all the
pertinent issues of its task at hand, and using fewer resources for negotiation. Therefore, the proposed strategy chooses to use the pipelined approach if the initiating agent is not confident in its profile of its peers, and
the packaged approach if it is. If the agent has a mixed
set of confidence in its peers, then it chooses a hybrid
set of pipelined and packaged approaches.
To evaluate the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy, we incorporate the strategy into a MultiPhase Coalition Formation (MPCF) framework [15,16].
Our experiments compare the performance of the
adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy with
the purely pipelined strategy and the purely packaged
strategy and show that the confidence-based one outperforms the others. We also investigate how our strategy affects the process (efficiency) and the outcome
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(effectiveness) of negotiations under different environmental conditions.
Note that the focus of this paper is on strategic negotiations instead of detailed negotiation tactics. Specifically, we focus on the initiating agent’s negotiation
strategy on how to conduct concurrent 1-to-many negotiations with multiple issues. Here, a negotiation
strategy does not deal with how each negotiation between agents should proceed at each interaction step;
instead, it manages how the concurrent negotiations
should be conducted in terms of scheduling and assigning different issues to different peer agents.
Note also that this paper is a significant extension of
[17], with more detailed discussions on the design of
the proposed strategy and additional experiments and
insights. The framework of the learning-based MultiPhase Coalition Formation was first proposed in [15]
and then further described in [16]. In this paper, we
briefly present the framework in Section 3 to provide a
context for the proposed strategy.

2. Related work
The research on negotiations can be classified into
two categories: tactical negotiations and strategic negotiations. Tactical negotiations research focuses on how to
conduct a negotiation with the step-by-step negotiation
tactics. The typical approaches include (1) the game-theoretic and auction-based mechanisms (e.g., [13]) that
focus on analyzing the interaction as a game between
identical participants, and seeking its equilibrium, (2)
the heuristic-based bargaining mechanisms (e.g., [3])
that are used in cases where it is not possible to reach
the optimal outcome due to resource limitations, dynamic environment or incomplete information, and are
mainly based on empirical testing and evaluation, and
(3) the argumentation-based approaches (e.g., [8]) that
allow agents to exchange meta-information about proposals and counterproposals. Since this paper focuses
on strategic negotiation, the following discussions are
primarily on strategic and hybrid negotiations.
2.1. Strategic negotiation
In general, strategic negotiation addresses the management of negotiations such as conflict resolution, resource allocation, preference concerns, concurrent negotiation coordination, and so on. In some applications
where agents are not completely autonomous, negotia-
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tions between agents have to be coordinated by a central arbitrator to resolve the conflict (e.g., [19]). In some
applications where there are resource constraints, strategic negotiations are employed to allocate resources
more efficiently (e.g., [6,7]). In some applications
where agents have special preferences like optional negotiation order, strategic negotiations are employed to
address the preferences (e.g., [4]). In our applications
we employ strategic negotiation to manage multiple
concurrent negotiations.
Sycara [19] presents a model of strategic negotiation
that combines case-based reasoning and optimization
of the multi-attribute utilities of agents, to resolve the
adversarial conflicts in the domain of labor relations.
An interesting component here is the use of a centralized arbitrator to handle the disagreements between
agents. This centralized arbitrator essentially acts as
the strategist as it has the knowledge of all disagreements and the goings-on in the environment, and thus
has the capacity to match-make or even coordinate negotiations to resolve disagreements. However, it is a
bottleneck, and its view of the environment may be too
broad to effectively address an agent’s needs. Our proposed solution does not use such a centralized arbitrator. The agents make decisions autonomously in a
peer-to-peer manner. Moreover, our strategy is aimed
to compromise the advantages of different negotiation approaches to improve both effectiveness and efficiency in negotiation, rather than simply seek the optimal negotiation outcome.
Kraus et al. [6,7] study strategic negotiation to improve the negotiation efficiency, specifically the negotiation time, similar to our work. They focus on the
passage of time and the preferences of the players for
different agreements as well as for opting out of the
negotiations. They assume agents have complete information about others. Different from their work, our
confidence-based negotiation strategy focuses on the
management of concurrent negotiations. Agents try to
reduce the overall negotiation time by choosing appropriate negotiation approaches, instead of by reducing
the step-by-step negotiation time. Agents are aimed to
improve both negotiation effectiveness and efficiency
at the same time. Moreover, our agents only have incomplete information about others. They take the strategic negotiations based on the confidence in negotiation partners’ consistent behaviors instead of the
preference, to adapt to the complex environment.
Most similar to our work, Fatima et al. [4] focus on
bilateral multi-issue strategic negotiation. The outcome
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of negotiation depends on two key factors: the agenda
(i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). The authors determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures and
the corresponding negotiation outcomes. For those
outcomes, the authors further identify the conditions
for which agents have identical preferences over the
optimal agenda and procedure, and use those to reach
agreements. The two negotiation procedures, issue-byissue and package deal, are similar to ours. However, a
key difference is that our initiating agent manages concurrent negotiations rather than only one bilateral negotiation. We also focus on possible issue switching
rather than re-arranging the negotiation order. Our
agents decide negotiation strategies based on the confidence in other agents’ behavior in dynamic and uncertain environments, rather than the preferences or constraints as in [4]. Finally, in our framework, the agents
learn over time the appropriate negotiation approach
to improve negotiation outcome and reduce negotiation time cost in complex environments, instead of
finding the optimal negotiation strategy (or outcome).
2.2. Combination of tactical negotiation and strategic
negotiation
In complex negotiation environments where both
negotiation tactics and negotiation management are
critical, combining tactical negotiation and strategic
negotiation is necessary. In such environments, tactical
negotiations are needed for agents to conduct step-bystep negotiation tactics while strategic negotiations are
needed to manage negotiations. Approaches are such
as the preference-driven approach (e.g., [14]), the heuristic approach (e.g., [11]), the utility-based approach
(e.g., [1]), and the syntax-dependent approach (e.g.,
[21]).We discuss these approaches in the following.
Sierra et al. [14] combine tactical negotiation and
strategic negotiation using a preference-driven approach in order to conduct many-to-many (i.e., multiple initiating agents and multiple responding agents)
negotiations on multiple issues. To achieve flexibility
during negotiation, they set different weights for optional negotiation tactics, allowing the varying importance of the criteria to be modeled over time. For example, when the time resource is sufficient, the tactics
that emphasize the behavior of other agents will be
given greater preference than the tactics which base
their values on the amount of time remaining. Thus

316

L.-K. S o h & X. L i

strategies combine tactics depending on the history of
negotiations and the mental state of agents. Our work
is similar to [14] in that both are concerned about time.
However, we combine the strategy together with tactics based on the environmental change rather than the
preferences, being more adaptive to the complex environments. The combination of strategic negotiation
and tactical negotiation in our work is loosely coupled,
which provides better modularity and flexibility.
Nguyen and Jennings [11] propose a heuristic approach to coordinate 1-to-many (i.e., one initiating
agent and multiple responding agents) negotiations on
a single issue. The initial strategy selection is based on
the initiating agents’ beliefs about others, and the negotiation tactics of agents in individual negotiations
depend on the negotiation status of the same issue.
Since they do not consider multi-issue negotiations,
there is no issue assignment work and no issue will
be switched from the pipeline of one agent to another
one, which is a key consideration in our work.
Chevaleyre et al. [1] propose a utility-based approach to manage many-to-many negotiations on
multiple issues. All agents involved in the concurrent
negotiations model their preferences by means of treestructured utility functions. An identical protocol is
used to guide the multilateral negotiations by modifying the utility functions of each agent during negotiations. As a result of a sequence of structurally simple
deals, an agreement with the maximal utilitarian social welfare (i.e., the maximal sum of all pleasures) can
be achieved. In our work we address the 1-to-many negotiations rather than the many-to-many negotiations.
The objective of our strategy is to improve negotiation
outcome and lower negotiation cost, rather than simply maximize the negotiation outcome. In our complex environments, the means of tree-structured utility
functions is not appropriate because it is time-consuming for agents to update the complex utility functions
adaptive to the dynamic and uncertain change of the
environments.
Zhang and Zhang [21] propose a negotiation solution based on the syntax-dependent formalism of belief revision to address the bilateral negotiation. They
combine the conflict resolution strategy together with
the step-by-step negotiation tactics. Specifically they
divide a negotiation procedure into two stages. In the
first stage, two agents meet together to work out mutually acceptable core demand from each side by stepby-step. In the second stage, each agent adjusts its own
demand in order to make it consistent with the consent
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reached in the first stage by conducting a course of belief revision. The outcome of the negotiation is then the
intersection of two agents’ revised demand sets. The
combination of the two types of negotiations in their
work is loosely coupled. Different from their work,
we address the 1-to-many negotiations rather than
the 1-to-1 negotiations. We use strategic negotiation to
conduct effective and efficient concurrent negotiations
rather than simply resolve conflicts.
3. Framework
Our overall framework is based on a model called
the Multi-Phase Coalition Formation (MPCF) model.
The model consists of three phases: coalition planning,
coalition instantiation and coalition evaluation, as depicted in Figure 1. In coalition planning, the agent applies case-based reasoning (CBR) to obtain a coalition
formation plan. In coalition instantiation, the agent carries out the planned formation strategy through 1-tomany negotiations with coalition candidates. In coalition evaluation, the agent evaluates the coalition
formation process, the formed coalition structure (if a
coalition is successfully formed), and the coalition execution outcome (if the coalition is executed eventually)
to determine the utility of the planned strategy and reinforces the strategy. In the following, we briefly outline the MPCF model. For details on this model, please
refer to [9,15,16]. For details on the tactical negotiations, please refer to [10].

Figure 1. The Multi-Phase Coalition Formation (MPCF) model.
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3.1. Coalition formation phases
In coalition planning, the coalition-initiating agent
applies CBR to derive a specific coalition formation plan for the current problem based on a previous plan stored in the case-base. Given a problem (a
task) to solve, the agent retrieves from its case-base
the case with the most similar problem description
to the current problem description. The agent then
adapts the case solution, based on the differences between the two problem descriptions, to compose a coalition formation plan (see Section 3.2). Briefly, a plan
is one that specifies guidelines for the agent on how
to form the coalition, including the number of neighbors to approach, the number of coalition candidates
to maintain, time allocated for the formation process,
and so on.
The coalition instantiation phase implements the coalition formation plan to form a coalition. At first, the
coalition-initiating agent normalizes the task— dividing the task into separate execution units as different
negotiation issues, computing the potential utilities of
its peers, and ranking the peers based on the potential
utilities. Then the agent concurrently negotiates with
each selected peer agent on the set of subtasks in an attempt to form the intended coalition. Each negotiation
is argumentative where the initiating agent attempts
to persuade the responding agent to perform a task or
provide a resource by providing support or evidence
for its request [18].
The coalition evaluation phase provides the basis
for an agent to improve its coalition formation plans.
This phase evaluates both the coalition instantiation
process (in terms of time spent, number of messages
used, number of peers approached, etc.) and the execution outcomes of the subtasks agreed upon in the coalition (in terms of the number of subtasks performed
by highly-capable peers, etc.). In general, a good plan
is one that uses little computational and communication resources with successful instantiations and subsequent executions.
3.2. Case-based reinforcement learning
We employ an integrated case-based reinforcement
learning strategy [16] to utilize the results of the evaluation phase to improve the coalition planning phase.
As alluded to in the previous section, our coalition formation framework relies on CBR to derive plans. Thus,
the experience (or lessons learned) is stored in the
cases.
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A case consists of a problem description, a solution, an outcome, and its utility. The problem description consists of an agent’s external and internal environments and the task description. The solution gives
a coalition formation plan which specifies (1) the number of coalition candidates, (2) the number of expected
coalition members, (3) the time allocated for coalition
instantiation, (4) the task allocation, and (5) the number of messages recommended. The outcome documents the coalition instantiation results among agents,
subtasks’ execution results, and the evaluation values
of the actual coalition formation process. The utility indicates the quality of the case, specifically, the quality of the plan in addressing the coalition problem represented in the case. Coupling the evaluation and the
problem description, the agent can learn a new coalition formation case to increase its coverage of cases or
can update the case’s utility using the evaluation result
to reinforce the case.
4. Confidence-based negotiation strategy
We first proposed the adaptive, confidence-based
negotiation strategy in [17]. We employ this strategy
to facilitate the initiating agents to conduct concurrent,
strategic negotiations, during the coalition instantiation phase. Here we first present the motivations behind such a strategy in Section 4.1. Then, we describe
the assumptions about the multiagent environment
that are necessary for the strategy to be beneficial in
Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 4.3, we discuss the algorithm for the strategy in details.
4.1. Strategy rationale
The objective of applying the proposed confidencebased negotiation strategy during the coalition instantiation phase is to help agents negotiate and form coalitions more effectively and more efficiently. It does
not deal with how agents take step-by-step negotiation
tactics; instead, it manages how the concurrent negotiations should be conducted in terms of scheduling and
assigning different issues to different coalition candidates (here an issue refers to a subtask to be executed,
especially the resource or capability required for the
execution of that subtask).
Let us first describe the two strategic negotiation approaches: (1) pipelined, and (2) packaged. To help us illustrate the differences between the two approaches,
suppose that at the end of the coalition planning
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phase, the plan calls for the initiating agent ai to approach two coalition candidates aj and ak (i.e., agents
that have been deemed to likely be able to help) to negotiate over several subtasks for task Tm. Specifically,
1
3
suppose aj is allocated two subtasks T m and T m, and ak
2
4
5
is allocated three subtasks T m, T m, and T m .
In the pipelined approach, ai concurrently negotiates
1
with aj and ak over one issue at a time, starting with T m
2
and T m, respectively. If the negotiation between ai and
aj completes successfully, then ai initiates another ne3
gotiation with aj to discuss T m, and so forth. Further,
suppose that ai has successfully negotiated with aj to
1
3
handle T m and T m. At this point, if ai realizes that (1)
5
aj is capable of performing T m, and (2) the negotiation
4
between ai and ak is still over T m, then ai can re-allo5
cate T m to aj and start another negotiation. Similarly,
if a negotiation over an issue fails, ai will attempt to
re-allocate that issue to another agent to try to salvage
the coalition instantiation phase. That is, agent ai has
the flexibility of dynamically changing the task set selected for negotiations with ak.
In the packaged approach, ai packages multiple issues into one single negotiation. Using the same example above, that means ai will initiate one negotia1
3
tion with aj, going over T m and T m in one shot, and
another negotiation with ak, trying to resolve all three
2
4
5
issues, T m, T m, and T m, at once. If two agents cannot
reach an agreement on an issue, then the package to
which the issue belongs fails as well. The last characteristic indicates that a package is either to be accepted
(after negotiation) or to be rejected, and cannot be accepted piecewise issue by issue.
In complex environments that are dynamic, uncertain, and real-time, agent behaviors are difficult to perceive or predict accurately by other agents. For example, an initiating agent ai may rank neighbor aj as the
best candidate and expect to reach an agreement for
its negotiation in a short time. However, it is possible
that aj is busy and unable to entertain the negotiation
request at that moment. Without a flexible management strategy, ai would have to wait until aj is available, probably missing the time deadline requirement.
It is also possible that, because of the dynamic nature
that we assume of our environment, the ranking of a
neighbor by an agent may change during a negotiation and may thus require the agent to terminate the
ongoing negotiation in favor of another. Thus we realize that there is a need for a management strategy that
is flexible, capable of adapting to the profiled behavior
of the neighbors as well as the real-time observation of
the negotiation activities.
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Comparing the two negotiation approaches, we see
that the pipelined approach is more cautious, flexible,
and opportunistic than the packaged approach. In the
former, the initiating agent may dynamically redistribute an issue from the original pipeline to a “free and capable” pipeline of another coalition candidate. So the
pipelined approach is preferred in uncertain and dynamic environments to increase the likelihood of successful negotiations. On the other hand, packaging multiple issues into one negotiation may reduce the number
of agents to approach and subsequently decrease computational and communication overheads. So the packaged approach may be preferred in resource-constrained, real-time environments. An initiating agent
thus needs to determine when to use which negotiation
approach with which responding agents, for different
issues during the same coalition formation task.
Note also that an initiating agent in our framework decides which approach to take based on the
confidence it has in what it has learned of each of its
neighbors. This allows the agent to consider volatility or uncertainty in the environment under resource
constraints.

4.2. Assumptions on problem domain
Our adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy is based on the following three assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Overlapping Capabilities Assumption). We assume that in the multi-agent system, the
agents have overlapping capabilities. This assumption
facilitates the pipelined negotiation approach. If no
agents share the same capabilities, then the pipelined
approach will not have the flexibility to be opportunistic, or the possibility to exploit the responding agents
that have completed negotiations early. For example, if
there is only one candidate that knows how to perform
1
a subtask T m, then the agent ai has no choice but to re1
serve T m for that candidate.
Assumption 2 (Efficient Multi-Issue Negotiation Assumption). We assume that packaging multiple issues
into a negotiation is more efficient than negotiating
each issue one by one. That means the resource cost
required by the packaged negotiation is less than that
by pipelined negotiation. Different from the pipelined,
one-at-a-time negotiation—in which an initiating agent
needs to send a request and a responding agent needs
to inform the negotiation outcome issue-by-issue, in
packaged negotiations, the agents request or inform
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over all the issues at one time. This assumption basically indicates that by packaging issues into one single
negotiation an initiating agent is able to reduce the negotiation overhead of the same set of issues, which in
turn reduces the computational and communication
costs (e.g., the coalition formation time and the communication bandwidth).
Assumption 3 (Additive Multi-Issue Negotiation Arguments Assumption). We assume that to persuade a
candidate (responding agent) to agree with a set of issues, the amount of arguments (or messages) that the
initiating agent has to provide for all the issues in the
packaged approach is the same as the total amount of
all the arguments that it has to provide for each of the
issues separately in the pipelined approach. This assumption supplements Assumption 2 in that the arguments needed by each issue in the packaged approach
are the same as those in the pipelined approach. But
the overhead of the former is less than the latter. In
some scenarios, this assumption may not hold as negotiating multiple issues altogether may increase flexibility in reaching a compromise agreeable to both parties,
and thus reducing the amount of arguments needed, at
the expense of added reasoning capacity on the agents.
Assumption 4 (Inter-Coalition Competition Assumption). We assume that there is inter-coalition competition among coalition formation tasks. The inter-coalition competition may occur in different situations.
First, concurrent coalition formation tasks compete for the
communication resources of the same agent. Particularly,
the same agent can be (i) a coalition-initiating agent
that initiates multiple, concurrent coalition formation
processes for these tasks, (ii) a responding agent that
is approached for these concurrent tasks by different
initiating agents, or (iii) a responding agent that is approached for these concurrent tasks of the same initiating agent. Second, coalition formation tasks compete
for the same capability (or problem-solving resource) of one
same agent. Particularly, the tasks can be requested by
different initiating agents, or those by the same initiating agent, and overlap temporarily or functionally.
Stemming from this intercoalition competition assumption, we assume that each task has a priority such
that an agent will be able to choose to perform the task
or subtask most important to itself.
Assumption 5 (Intra-Coalition Competition Assumption). We assume that there is intra-coalition competition among different subtask (negotiation issues) of the
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same coalition formation task. The intracoalition competition may occur in different situations: (1) when the
coalition-initiating agent decides on the negotiation
order of different subtasks that have been allocated
to different neighbors, and (2) when the coalition-initiating agent requests for help from multiple agents
for the same subtask. As a result of this assumption,
we also assume that initiating agent will be able to sequence the negotiation issues according to their specified execution start times. We also further assume that
the initiating agent has a degree of greediness that it exercises as an “insurance” policy. That is, if a subtask is
of high priority, then to make sure that it will be able
to get it solved, the initiating agent may choose to request from multiple agents that it knows to help solve
the subtask. The “greedier” the initiating agent is, for
example, the more agents it will approach.
4.3. Strategy description
The proposed adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy works as follows. First, an initiating agent
ai selects only agents that it knows to be capable of performing the subtasks of a task to be solved as coalition
candidates. Second, depending on the subtasks and
the capabilities of the coalition candidates, ai allocates
the subtasks as negotiation issues with specific coalition candidate. These first two steps are as dictated
by the derived coalition formation plan as a result of
casa-based reasoning. Third, during the coalition instantiation phase, ai decides to use either the packaged or pipelined approach for each candidate based
on its confidence in its perception of each coalition candidate’s capabilities. For example, if the behavior of a
coalition candidate aj has been consistent as observed
by ai—e.g., aj has always agreed to ai’s requests very
quickly—then ai can anticipate that negotiating with
aj over the new issues will likely lead to a high-utility
outcome. However, if the behavior of aj has not been
consistent as observed by ai, then ai may choose to be
cautious and do not package all issues into one negotiation with aj .
An initiating agent ai computes its confidence value
in a candidate aj in the following manner:
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where Chp ai (aj , ts) is the value of the aj ’s mth characteristic related with coalition process, observed by ai at
n
time ts (s ∈ [1, ]); and Chp ai (aj , ts) is the value of one
of aj ’s nth characteristic related with coalition outcome,
m
observed by ai at time ts (s ∈ [1, ]). Further, Chp ai (aj)
n
and Chp ai (aj) are the corresponding means, and  is
the window size of ai’s observation periods ( ≥ 1). A
larger window size  means more interactions between
the two agents and thus may lead to higher confidence
in ai’s observations of aj . ωm and ωn are weights used to
balance the values of the parameters related with coalition process and coalition outcome respectively. ωChp
and ωCho are the weights used to emphasize the role of
the process or the outcome. A higher ωChp is preferred
in highly resource-constrained, real-time environments
to facilitate a negotiation approach that may incur less
resource costs (e.g., time); on the other hand, a higher
ωCho is preferred in highly uncertain environments to
have a higher likelihood of securing a successful negotiation outcome.
Note that ai profiles aj ’s behavior with two sets of
characteristics, the process set (Chp) and the outcome
set (Cho). The process set pertains to the negotiation
process and consists of (1) the tardiness degree of the
candidate aj, indicating the time it takes aj to respond
to a request by ai during negotiation (i.e., the average message round-trip-time between the two agents
as observed by ai), (2) the hesitation degree of the candidate aj, indicating how ready aj is to agree to a request by ai (i.e., the amount of arguments that ai needs
to provide to persuade aj), and (3) the busyness degree
of the candidate aj (i.e., the number of on-going negotiations between ai and aj at present). The outcome set
pertains to the quality of the coalition outcome and
consists of (1) the satisfaction degree of the candidate
aj, indicating how much aj agrees to meet ai’s request
(i.e., the negotiation utility of aj to ai for a particular issue (or subtask)), and (2) the capability of the candidate
aj, indicating how well aj is capable of executing the
agreed subtask (i.e., the execution utility of aj to ai on
a particular issue (or subtask)). Note that the satisfaction degree is the upper bound on how well a subtask
can be executed while capability is the actual observed
quality of outcome. Due to the uncertainty in the environment, it is possible for the execution utility to be
significantly less than the negotiation utility of a candidate to the initiating agent.
Given the above definition of confidence, an initiating agent ai can choose to perform the pipelined
approach with a candidate aj if Confai(aj) less than a
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threshold κ, and to perform the packaged approach
otherwise. A low κ may be preferred to avoid being
overly conservative and always negotiating with each
candidate in the pipelined approach if significant gains
can be obtained from the packaged approach. For example, if the packaged approach significantly reduces
the amount of arguments needed and therefore the
time needed to negotiate successfully, then one may
choose a low κ. On the other hand, in situations where
task allocations are very dynamic and flexible, a high
κ may be preferred to avoid being overly rigid and always negotiating with each candidate in the packaged
approach.
Ultimately, the coalition formation process is based
on a plan and the plan may not work as expected during the coalition instantiation process. Focusing only
on the packaged approach vs. the pipelined approach,
we see that it is possible for the initiating agent to lose
contact with a candidate due to communication loss,
agent faults, or extremely long communication delay. In such a case, the initiating agent needs to have
a contingency plan to persist with the coalition instantiation process. In general, if the packaged approach is
used, and a candidate is found to be non-responsive,
then the agent may break up the package and distributes the issues to the remaining candidates in the coalition. For the pipelined approach, the response is
more straightforward—simply transferring the issues
to other pipelines. And, in the case where the initiating agent is stuck with a particular issue negotiating
with a non-responsive candidate, the agent will duplicate another negotiation with another candidate on the
same issue and conduct the two negotiations in parallel. Whichever negotiation completes successfully first
will prompt the agent to terminate the other.

5. Experimental results
We implemented the adaptive, confidence-based
negotiation strategy into the Multi-Phase Coalition
Formation (MPCF) framework in a multiagent system.
In the system, each agent has multiple overlapping capabilities and is capable of performing multiple tasks.
When an agent encounters a task, it first analyzes
whether it is able to solve the problem all by itself; if
not, it initiates a coalition formation process. Each
agent has 3 + N threads: (1) a core thread to manage
tasks, reason, and learn, (2) a communication thread, (3)
an execution thread for task simulation, and (4) N ne-
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Table 1. The experiment sets
Experiment Sets

Dynamic Range

Uncertainty Range

Real-Time Degrees

EB1
EB2
EB3

[RTTmin, 2 RTTmin]
[RTTmin, 2.5 RTTmin]
[RTTmin, 3 RTTmin]

[0.6, 1.0]
[0.4, 1.0]
[0.2, 1.0]

0~6
0~6
0~6

gotiation threads for concurrent negotiations with other
agents.
In this paper, we report some experimental results
aimed to quantitatively evaluate the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy in complex environments by comparing its performance with a purely
packaged and a purely pipelined strategy. The purely
packaged strategy is one where the initiating agent
packages all issues allocated to each candidate and negotiates over them via one negotiation process. If the
two agents cannot agree on any of the issues, the entire
package is considered a failure. The initiating agent
then approaches another candidate that is free and capable of addressing all the issues of the package. The
purely pipelined approach is one where all issues are
individually negotiated, and issues can be re-distributed to available pipelines as long as the candidates
are capable of addressing those issues.
We evaluate the performances in terms of coalition
formation efficiency and effectiveness. The efficiency is
measured in terms of the cost of the coalition formation process, while effectiveness is measured in terms
of the quality of the outcome of the formed coalition.
5.1. Experiment sets
We have three experiment sets: EB1, EB2, and EB3,
as shown in Table 1. There are three environment parameters that we vary for our experiments:
(1) Dynamic range: This represents the range within
which agents’ dynamic behavior varies. We have simulated a variety of dynamic ranges of the environment
through setting different variation ranges of agents’
tardiness degrees, as defined previously in Section 4.3.
Thus, this range describes a key characteristic of the
negotiation process. As shown in Table 1, EB3 is the
most dynamic while EB1 is the least dynamic.
(2) Uncertainty range: This represents the range
within which negotiation outcomes may vary given the
same pair of agents and the same issues. Specifically,
we simulate this range by varying agent’s satisfaction
degrees, as defined in Section 4.3 above. This characteristic has a direct impact on negotiation outcome.
As shown in Table 1, a 1.0 means that the satisfaction

Table 2. Real-time environmental settings
Real-Time Degrees
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Time Limits (ticks)
50000
27500
25000
22500
20000
17500
15000

degree is 100% (a full deal can be reached), a 0.2 means
that it is only 20% (only a partial deal can be reached).
Thus, EB3 is the most uncertain while EB1 is the least
uncertain.
(3) Real-time degree: This represents the time constraints in negotiations. Any negotiation that runs longer than its time limit is aborted, yielding a 0 for the
outcome utility. Table 2 shows the actual time limit for
each real-time degree. A degree of 0 indicates that the
environment is non-real-time as the agents will have
more than sufficient time to carry out their negotiations. Thus, a degree of 1 is the least time-constraining while a degree of 6 is the most time-constraining.
All three experiment sets have the same range of time
constraints.
Note that due to the real-time constraints, it is possible that an agent never gets around to tackle all subtasks of a task. Thus, there will be subtasks that are not
yet negotiated at the end of the time limit. For these
subtasks, each will count as 0 towards the overall utility of the task. In this manner, we not only keep track
of failed negotiations, but also take into account negotiations waiting in the task queue that an agent fails to
initiate.
5.2. Efficiency: Cost in negotiation processes
To examine whether the confidence-based strategy outperforms others in negotiation cost, we compare each strategy’s average number of messages sent
for negotiations per task, and average negotiation time
per task in non-real-time environments (ES1, ES2,
and ES3). We specify the negotiation time of a coalition
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Figure 3. Comparison on negotiation cost: (a) message cost,
and (b) time cost. PA = purely-packaged, PI = purely-pipelined, and CS = confidence-based.

Figure 2. Comparison on negotiation time in EB1, EB2, and
EB3, from the less dynamic and uncertain to the more dynamic and uncertain environments. PA = purely-packaged, PI
= purely-pipelined, and CS = confidence-based.

formation task from the moment when a coalitioninitiating agent begins to negotiate for the task to the
moment when the agent receives the last outcome of
negotiations. If the time limit comes first before all issues (subtasks) are negotiated, then all ongoing negotiations will be aborted, and remaining issues that
are yet-to-be-negotiated will also be removed. In this
case, the negotiation time of the task is the time limit
allocated to the task. Figure 2 shows the results over
different real-time degrees, where PA represents the
purely-packaged negotiation strategy, PI represents
the purely-pipelined negotiation strategy, and CB rep-

resents the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation
strategy, while Figure 3 shows the averaged results of
the three strategies.
In non-real-time environments, the number of messages sent for negotiations in each task depends primarily on (1) the number of issues in the task, (2) the
number of arguments required by each candidate, (3)
the number of candidates approached with the packaged or the pipelined strategy, and (4) the issues’ distribution pattern among the candidates. The environment’s dynamism or uncertainty is relatively a
nonimpact, since the agents have ample time to carry
out their negotiations and to re-distribute issues to obtain the best deals. From Figure 3(a), we observe that
the confidence-based strategy needed more messages
than the purely packaged, but fewer messages than
the purely pipelined. This result is expected. First,
with Assumption 3, the only way for the packaged
approach to outperform the pipelined approach is its
ability of lowering message overhead as agents using
the packaged approach deal with fewer requests. As a
result, PA outperforms CB, and CB outperforms PI.
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From Figs 2 and 3(b), we observe that in all three
experiment sets, the average negotiation time of tasks
in PI is always the highest. Note that in CB, the agents
choose when to use a mixture of packaged and pipelined approaches when forming coalitions. Since it is
evident that the CB outperforms PI, that implies that
the agents are able to make the correct decisions—
picking the right candidates to use the pipelined or
packaged approach—to improve their efficiency.
Furthermore, in non-real-time environments (i.e.,
when real-time degree is 0), when the environment
is more dynamic and uncertain (moving from EB1 to
EB3), the average negotiation time for PA increases,
while it decreases for both PI and CB. Upon closer
analysis, we realize that when the environment is more
dynamic and uncertain (as in EB2 and EB3), it is more
likely for a candidate to possibly respond more slowly.
That results in more chances for some issues waiting
in the pipelines to be moved from slow-progressing
pipelines to the fast-progressing ones, if the latter have
empty slots in the schedule of the pipelines. The noncritical time constraint also makes these switches possible. This thus results in the lower values of negotiation times observed for PI and CB. This implies that in
more dynamic and uncertain environments, a design
that incorporates some pipelined approach can outperform a purely packaged one in negotiation efficiency.
Interestingly, in EB1, EB2, and EB3, when the realtime degrees of the environments are increased, the difference in the average negotiation time between CB and
PA decreases. Especially when the real-time degree increases from 4 to 6, the average negotiation time in the
confidence-based strategy is almost equal to that in the
purely-packaged strategy. Upon further analysis, we
find that this is because when the time constraints became more critical, more negotiations were aborted
sooner so much so that moving issues around from one
candidate to another was futile: there are simply not
enough agents to handle all the necessary subtasks or issues within the time limit. As a result, the difference is
insignificant in negotiation time between CB and PA.
Therefore, we see that the adaptive, confidencebased negotiation strategy can outperform the purely
packaged strategy in negotiation cost when the environment is less real-time, and more dynamic and uncertain; but cannot when the environment is less
dynamic and uncertain. On the other hand, the confidence-based strategy generally outperforms the purely
pipelined strategy in terms of the average negotiation
time in all non-real-time scenarios. That the agents us-
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ing the confidence-based strategy are able to save time
using packaged negotiations indicates that the environment is still consistent enough for the agents to
make confident and useful profiles of their interactions
with other agents. This also indicates that our experiments do not identify a cutoff point above which the
purely pipelined strategy will always outperform the
confidence-based strategy. Ultimately, we hypothesize
that when the environment is extremely dynamic and
uncertain, the confidence-based strategy will conform
to the purely pipelined one.
5.3. Effectiveness: Negotiation outcome
To examine whether the confidence-based strategy
outperforms others in the quality of the negotiation
outcome, we compare each strategy’s average negotiation outcome utility of all the tasks in the experiment
sets, shown in Figure 4. Note that the outcome utility
reported is the average of all 99 tasks negotiated, and
each task’s negotiation outcome utility is the average
of the satisfaction degree achieved for each of its issues
(subtasks).
From Figure 4, we observe that in non-real-time environments (real-time degree = 0), in EB1, EB2, and
EB3, the difference in the negotiation outcome among
the three approaches is insignificant. That is, with sufficient negotiation time, the more flexible PI approach
does not yield better negotiation outcome than does
the confidence-based strategy or the purely-pipelined
strategy. Furthermore, when the environment is less
time-critical, especially when the environment is less
dynamic and uncertain (e.g., in EB1, real-time degree
is from 1 to 3), CB still fails to outperform PA. On one
hand, the coalition-initiating agent in CB is more confident in its coalition candidates that it selects the packaged approach more often. On the other hand, with
relatively sufficient negotiation time and relatively fast
response time, the pipelined approach does not yield
better average negotiation outcome for the confidencebased strategy. However, CB does perform as well or
outperforms both PA and PI in all but one (i.e., EB1,
real-time degree = 3) real-time environments, validating the confidence-based strategy that adaptively combines the more opportunistic pipelined approach and
the more efficient packaged approach to conduct multiple, concurrent negotiations effectively.
Note that as the real-time constraints become more
stringent, the negotiation outcomes in all the strategies
deteriorate, as expected since there are more negotiations
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be able to negotiate all issues. In that case, being opportunistic does not necessarily pay off: if the negotiations are not completed soon enough, the issues waiting in the pipelines will not get a chance to be moved
from a slower pipeline to a faster one. Thus, the advantage of the pipelined approach lessens. On the other
hand, by packaging issues into one single negotiation,
the purely-packaged strategy can actually by chance
complete negotiations within the imposed time limit
for some tasks. Thus, we have found a cutoff point
in terms of real-time degree above which the purelypackaged strategy starts to outperform the purelypipelined strategy for the three different scenarios.
Based on the above results and analysis, we see that
(1) the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy
can outperform the purely-pipelined strategy in negotiation outcome when the environment is time constrained; and (2) the adaptive, confidence-based negotiation strategy can outperform the purely-packaged
strategy in negotiation outcome when the environment
is highly time-constrained but less dynamic and uncertain, or when the time-constrained environment is
more dynamic and uncertain.
6. Conclusions and future work

Figure 4. Comparison on negotiation outcome in EB1, EB2,
and EB3, from the less dynamic and uncertain to the more dynamic and uncertain environments. PA = purely packaged, PI
= purely pipelined, and CB = confidence-based.

aborted due to the time limits. Noticeably, CB’s performance deteriorates at the slowest rate. This hints that
(a) the confidence-based strategy is more robust than
PA and PI, and (b) the strategy is able to make good
decisions on when to use the packaged or pipelined
negotiation approach appropriately.
Unexpectedly, PA outperforms PI in terms of average negotiation outcome in most scenarios, especially
when the real-time constraint is high. This is counter-intuitive because the pipelined negotiation approach is supposed to be more flexible and opportunistic. Upon closer analysis, we realize that when a
negotiation task is highly time-constrained, PI may not

We have described an adaptive, confidence-based
negotiation strategy in the problem domain of multiagent coalition formation. This strategy addresses
multi-issue strategic negotiations in complex environments. In our strategy, an agent chooses a combination
of pipelined and packaged approaches to conduct multiple, concurrent negotiations with its peers based on
the agent’s confidence in its peer’s consistency. Our experiments have found that the confidence-based strategy generally outperforms the purely packaged and
purely pipelined strategies in a variety of dynamic,
uncertain, and real-time environments. We have also
found a cutoff point where the strategy starts to lose
ground to the purely packaged approach. Further, we
have observed how the purely packaged approach can
be more effective than the purely pipelined one in a
highly dynamic and uncertain environment, when it
is highly time-constrained. Our results are also supported by [2]. Note that the computation of the confidence measure can be seen as a form of learning: an
initiating agent’s assessment of a candidate’s capability gained from a series of observations over time. Excelente-Toledo and Jennings [2] showed that learning
improves the decision making when agents are uncer-
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tain about the other agents’ actions, and that learning
is ineffective when agents operate in more static environments when compared to other agents that can
make reasonably accurate predictions about their environment and other agents. A key difference is that our
agents make decisions to use the packaged or pipeline
approach based on their confidence in what they have
learned, instead of making decisions based directly on
what they have learned.
Our current and immediate work include conducting further experiments (1) with larger dynamism and
uncertainty ranges to locate the cutoff point beyond
which the purely pipelined strategy outperforms the
confidence-based strategy, (2) with more agents and
more issues (and more diverse capabilities) to study
the rate of an agent in finally feeling the impact of
the confidence-based strategy—presently, the experiments were setup so that an agent was able to profile
a peer’s consistency quite accurately after only a few
tasks, and (3) with noise injected into the environment
such as noise in communication (e.g., messages getting
dropped) and the specification of tasks (e.g., issues
change after receipt).
Further, we look to improving the negotiation strategy to address the uncertainty of the environment.
How should the agents learn how to pick the right
pipeline to which to move negotiation issues? Presently, the initiating agent simply opportunistically
chooses the pipeline that is free and where the candidate is capable. However, a free pipeline and a capable candidate do not guarantee that the candidate will
agree to handle the new issue. This is because, in a
complex environment, an agent that is not busy now
may become very busy in the next few moments, or a
communication link that is fast now may become very
congested and slow next. Based on the confidence
that the initiating agent has in its candidates and past
“transfer” utility, perhaps the agent can learn to be
more conservative and patient against the uncertainty
of the environment. This is the key to improve the
quality of the coalition since the original assignment of
subtasks (issues) to each candidate is deemed to be the
best plan that the agent has derived during its coalition
planning phase.
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